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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARCHIE NIELSON and SYLVIA
W. NIELSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
v.
C. A. RASMUSSEN, C. WESLEY
RASMUSSEN and BERNICE C. RASMUSSEN, his wife,

Case No. 14,376

Defendants,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs, and
Respondents,
v.
BERT CARTER and BLANCH G. CARTER,
his wife,
Third-Party
Defendants and
Respondents,
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to impose a constructive trust upon certain property purchased from the appellants by the third-party
defendants.

Appellants claim that the third-party defendants

agreed to hold four (4) building lots sold to them in trust for
the defendants and third-party plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on the 2 3rd and 24th day
of September, 19 75, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock.
Court found in favor of the defendants Carter and against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action.

The

The plaintiffs objected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law of the trial court and made a motion to make additional
findings and a motion for a new trial.

On November 20, 19 75, the

Court denied plaintiffs' objection and motions-

The plaintiffs

appeal the decision of the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Court declare that a constructive trust was imposed upon certain property purchased by the
third-party defendants from the plaintiffs,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 13, 1962, the llielsons and Rasmussens entered into
an agreement whereby the Nieisons agreed to deed to the Rasmussens
thirteen building lots.

As consideration for the deeding of the

lots, the Rasmussens agreed to build a house for the Nieisons on
property owned by the Nieisons.
than $13,000.00.

The house was to cost not less

The house was completed in July, 19 62, and the

Nieisons moved in and continued to live in the house until Mr*
Nielson died and Mrs. Nielson was hospitalized.
In July, 1965, the Nieisons discovered the house cost only
$8,500.00 to build, not $13,000.00, as agreed and subsequently
brought suit against the Rasmussens (R. 4-8). About the same
time the dispute between the Rasmussens and the Nieisons arose
the third-party defendant, Bert Carter, became interested in the
property owned by the Nieisons.

The Nieisons settled their claim

against the Rasmussens and agreed that upon completion of the
terms of the settlement agreement, they would dismiss with prejudice their lav/suit against the Rasmussens (R. 16-21) . Because
the defendant Carter was interested in purchasing the remaining
-2-

Nielson property/ a meeting was arranged whereby the Rasmussens and
Carter would determine which lots would be transferred to Rasmussens in the event Carter purchased the property.
Problems with the description of the property to be transferred arose in view of the fact that Carter anticipated subdividing the Nielson property and wished to file a subdivision
plat which would describe the Nielson property for future development.
While these negotiations were continuing, Carter^induced the
Nielsons to transfer all of their property to him on the promise
that he would later transfer four (4) lots to the Rasmussens.
The Nielsons entered into the agreement without discussing the
matter with their attorney, relying upon the representations of
Carter, whom they trusted completely.

Carter admits discussing

the transfer of the lots with the Rasmussens and admits that he
knew that the Rasmussens claimed some interest in the lots.
On January 18, 1974, the Rasmussens answered the complaint
of the Nielsons originally filed in 1966, and also counterclaimed
against the Nielsons, claiming the Nielsons failed to comply with
the terms of the settlement agreement.

The Rasmussens further

filed a third-party complaint against Carter, claiming Carter induced the Nielsons to breach their settlement agreement with the
Rasmussens (R. 11-15).
On February 7, 1974, the Nielsons answered the Rasmussens1
counterclaim and, in addition, filed a third-party complaint
against Carter claiming that Carter participated in the negotiation that culminated in the settlement agreement with the
Rasmussens.

The theory of the Nielsons1 third-party complaint
-3-

was that Carter was holding the lots in constructive trust for
the Rasmussens (R. 26-28).
Carter denies that ha at any time held the lots in trust
for the Rasmussens.

Both the Rasmussens and the Nielsons

contend that they did not discover that Carter had failed to
place the lots in escrow or that he denied that the Rasmussens had
any interest in the properties until April 18, 19 74 when his
deposition was taken*
After trial of the matter, the Court entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which stated that the defendant
Carter did not agree to hold any part of the property in trust
for the Rasmussens and that the conveyance of the property by
Nielsons to Carters was not made upon any agreement that Carters
would hold the four lots as trustees for plaintiffs (R. 160).
The Court also found that there was no confidential relationship
existing between the Nielsons and the Carters and that the relationship between the Nielsons and the Carters was of a seller and
buyer of real estate without prior dealings (R. 160). Appellants
appeal the decision of the trial court.
All parties have agreed which lots will be subject to the
constructive trust if it is imposed by this Court.
ARGUMENT
The main issue before the trial court and the basic issue of
this appeal is whether the sale of property by the Nielsons to
the Carters was subject to a constructive trust in favor of the
Rasmussens.

Appellants contend that the written agreement be-

tween the plaintiffs and third-party defendants (Ex. 1) did not
reflect the true intent and agreement between the parties in that
-4-

it failed to state that the property was subject to an interest
of the Rasnussens in approximately 1-1/3 acres (four unspecified
lots), that defendant Bert Carter had previously promised to
convey to the Rasmussens.

Parol evidence was offered at trial

to prove the terms and existence of this oral agreement.

This

evidence clearly established that the written contract and deed
(Exs. 1 and 2) did not contain all of the terms agreed upon by
the parties, and showed that the defendant Bert Carter had taken
the property with an understanding that he would convey the four
unspecified lots to the Rasmussens.

The evidence also clearly

established that a relationship of confidence existed between the
Nielsons and Mr. Carter.

Appellants, therefore, maintain that

the trial court erred in not finding that the conveyance between
the parties was subject to a constructive trust.
POINT I
TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPpSE A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST ON THE LAND CONVEYED TO THE CARTERS.
Utah law clearly supports the imposition of a constructive
trust to remedy an inequitable situation.

This imposition is

particularly applicable to the reformation of a written document
to prevent an unconscionable result.

The latest Utah case sup-

porting this doctrine is Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah,
1975).

This case also involved a conveyance of real property and

is very similar to the present case.
The Kesler decision clearly sets forth the standard for the
imposition of a constructive trust on a written instrument so
that the conveyance may reflect the real intent of the parties as
proven by parol evidence.
- 5 -
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Concerning defendant's contention that he
had a right to place inviolable reliance upon
the written instruments and that they were not
subject to be varied or contradicted because of
the parol evidence rule/ this is to be said:
that rule has long been recognized as sound
and as having a salutary purpose in proper
circumstances. But, like all other rules, its
purpose is to serve the cause of justice and
not to defeat it. Therefore, there have come
into being numerous exceptions in situations
where the rigid adherence to the rule would
have that effect- One of the notable ones,
which has application here, is that as between
the immediate parties, where the terms of the
written instrument are mistaken in that they
do not show what the true intent and agree-.,
ment between the parties was, it may be reformed to show that intent. 542 P.2d at 358.
In the present case, the plaintiffs are seeking to have the
written instrument "reformed" by having a constructive trust
imposed upon the transfered property.

Regardless of the methods

of reformation used, appellants believe that the standard is the
same.'
Although the Kesler opinion was handed down after this case
was decided at the trial level, this rule of law is not new to
Utah.

Appellants contend that the rule precisely fits the facts

in this case and that the evidence clearly established the
grounds for its application.
Other Utah decisions and the law in other jurisdictions support the imposition of constructive trusts in situations similar
to those in the present case.

The case of Haws v. Jensen, 116

Utah 2d 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949) is particularly pertinent and
should be controlling in this case.

In Haws, this Court ruled

that a constructive trust should be imposed on land conveyed by
warranty deed, even though the deed was absolute on its face.
The Haws decision points out that an oral agreement to dispose of

or to hold land in a certain manner may constitute the basis of a
constructive trust.

In ruling on this issue, the Utah Supreme

Court said:
. . . under certain circumstances existing at
the time a conveyance in trust is made, no writing evidencing an intent to create a trust is
required. In those instances, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the property
in favor of the person or persons designated
by the grantor as the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive
trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent
unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law
and is^not within the statute of frauds. 209
P.2d at 231.
Decisions in other jurisdictions also support the equity of
imposing constructive trusts upon property that was conveyed by a
deed absolute.

The Wyoming case of Edmonds v. Galey, 458 P.2d

650 (Wyo. 1969) recognizes that the aforementioned rule is the
"prevailing" one and states that the intent of the parties may be
proved by parol evidence.

The Wyoming court cites the following

cases as standing for this rule of equity:

Suburban Home Mortg.

Co. v. Hopwood, 83 Ohio App. 115, 81 N.E.2d 387, 390; Hill v.
Irons, 160 Ohio St. 21, 113 N.E.2d 243, 247; Jose v. Pacific Title
and Porcelain Co., 251 Cal. App.2d 141, 58 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882;
Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal. 2d 154, 168 P.2d 946; and Haws v.
Jensen, supra; Cf. Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594
(1961).
For other cases which hold that a constructive trust should
be imposed when the grantee has orally promised to reconvey land
and subsequently refuses to perform, see King v. Uhlmann, 103
Ariz. 136, 437 P.2d 928 (1968); Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal.2d 693,
242 P.2d 5 (1952); Shipe v. Hillman, 206 Ore. 556, 292 P.2d 123
(1955); and Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wash.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393
-7-

(1955) .
The California case of Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal.
App. 116, 140 P.2d 31 (1943) is very similar to the facts in this
case.

The California court imposed a constructive trust on the

theory that the repudiation of an oral promise to reconvey is a
fraud upon the transferor which gives rise to a constructive
trust, by which the courts will compel restitution.

For other

cases, which show that constructive trusts should be imposed to
prevent the unconscionable enrichment of a party due to any abuse
of the confidence of another, see Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah
133, 141 P.2d

882 (1943); In Re Estate of Rose, 10 8 Ariz. 101,

493 P.2d 112 (1972); and Austin v. Wysowatcky, 511 P.2d 526
(Colo. 1973).
All of the above cases show that a court, sitting in equity,
should enforce a constructive trust when it is evident that a
grantor, trusting that the grantee would perform an oral agreement, has conveyed his property by absolute deed.

Appellants

believe that the evidence at trial clearly supported and proved
all of the necessary factors.
During the course of the trial, the plaintiffs introduced
evidence from three separate individuals which indicated that the
defendant Bert Carter knew that the fifteen acres were subject to
an interest of the Rasmussens and that he would have to convey
four unspecified lots to them.

The deposition of the plaintiff,

Archie Nielson (deceased), was read into the record and in it, he
repeatedly alleged that Garter had agreed to convey four lots to
Wesley Rasmussen subsequent to the original conveyance.

(Tr. 31,

36, 37, 40, "41-42, 43, 45, 55, 66, 67, 69, 70). Sylvia Nielson
confirmed these allegations and the fact that this condition was

made explicitly clear at the time of the signing on May 18, 1966.
(T.r.-86, 91, 93, 96-97, 101, 106, 112-114).

LaPreal Crompton was

also present at the Nielson home when the negotiations and signing occurred.

She verified that the agreement was made and that

Carter promised to reconvey four lots to Rasmussen.

(Tr. 161,

162, 163, 167-168) .
Perhaps the most important testimony is that of the defendant Bert Carter.

Although Carter denies the agreement, he made

the-following admissions, which illustrate that Carter knew of
Rasmussens1 interest and, therefore, had not paid for that portion of the land which was subject to the trust:
Q [Mr. Lewis] At the time of the signing
of the agreement did you — and thereafter did
you know there was one and one-third acres in
that property that didn't belong to you?
* * *

A I knew that there was some property that
I talked to Mr. Nielson about that I told him
that I was going to hold a little money back on
account I wasn't sure there was going to be a
clear deed and without liens and encumberances
on that property until him and Rasmussen got
through a feuding. And he said that's all right.
Q (By Mr. Lewis) And that was one and
one-third acres, was it not?
MR. JEFFS:
A

Objection

Well, approximately.

Close to it, yes.

Q (By Mr. Lewis) Well, that's what you
considered, wasn't it, one and one-third acres
to make up four lots?
A Well, I came to that conclusion by the ... amount' of money-wise. • There was 19 hundred
dollars, I paid 14 hundred dollars an acre. So
you can see it would be around an acre and a
third, or in any location of the 15 acres, not
in one location. It was just held back for my
security to make sure I got a clear piece of
property.
-Q-.

Q And you're still holding that back as of
today, are you not?
A I am as of today until this feuding gets
over. That's legally, morally his money. It
hasn't been money that's been taken out of the
contract. It is assigned money that is his
money, that is due him. (Tr. 138)
Carter's testimony was also impeached by his admissions at
his previous deposition.

This exchange was presented to Carter

at trial:
Q Well, let me call your attention to page
7 of your deposition, line 8, and ask you if you
did not answer — if this question was not asked
you and you gave the following answer. "Question:
It was your understanding that lots were to be
transferred to the Rasmussens?" "Answer: Yes."
"At all time it's been your understanding?"
"Answer: Uh-huh." (Tr. 130-131)..
At other times in the trial, Carter referred to the lots in question as "his lots" (referring to Rasmussen) (Tr. 122, line 21).
His testimony also clearly reveals that he was aware of the Rasmussenfs interest prior to the deeding of the property: \
Q (By Mr. Lewis) "Question: When did you
first learn that Mr. Nielson was to transfer properties to the Rasmussens?" "Answer: That was
right about the time the contract was made up,
and I was buying the ground before I knew that."
"Question: But you did know it before the contract for the sale of the land was written?"
"Answer: Yes." Now, was that your testimony?
A Yes, I knew it before the transfer of
the land.
Q And is that your testimony at the present
time? . .
A I knew before the signing of.the contracts
but I didn't agree to it.
Q You knew, did you not, that there were,
four lots that were to go to the Rasmussens, four
lots that were north of the creek?
A I knew that they wanted four lots north
of the creek. (Tr. 129).

This testimony clearly shows that Carter was aware of Rasmus-sens -1---: interest in the land and that he had deducted the cost
of the 1-1/3 acres from the total price of the purchase.

These

admissions negate Carter's denial of Rasmussens1 interest and the
agreement between the parties.

Carter's testimony also points

out that he knew of the Rasmussens1 claim and interest before the
documents were executed.

,

(Tr. 144).

The evidence clearly and convincingly proves that the conveyance was made with an understanding that Carter would later
convey four lots to Wesley Rasmussen although there was no mention of this promise in the formal documents.

That the documents

did not reflect the entire agreement is also evident from the
testimony of Archie Nielson (Tr. 28, 37, 38, 40, 67, 69), Sylvia
Nielson (Tr. 86, 96-97, 102, 104, 106), and LaPreal Crompton (Tr.
161, 163, and 167). Such testimony is clearly admissible under
Haws to prove the evidence of the oral agreement and to establish
the constructive trust.
Because the clear weight of the evidence shows the existence
of an oral agreement which is not reflected in the terms of the
written contract or deed, the trial court erred in refusing to
impose a constructive trust on the land deeded to Bert and Blanch
Carter.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONCERNING A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. The trial court properly recognized that one of the preconditions for the imposition of a constructive trust is the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties which
-11-

causes the grantor to rely on the assurances of the grantee.
This was the applicable law in this matter pursuant to the standard set forth in the Haws case, supra:
A constructive trust is imposed even if
there is no fiduciary relationship such as that
between attorney and client, principal and agent,
trustee and beneficiary; it is sufficient that
there is a family relationship or other personal ' '
relationship of such a character that the transferor is justified in believing that the transferee will act in his interest?71 Restatement
of the Law of Trust, Sec. 44, comment (c), accord.
A constructive trust will be imposed even though
at the time of the transfer the transferee intended to perform the agreement, and even though
he was not guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the confidential relation consists merely in the failure of
the transferee to perform his promise. Scott on
Trust, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by
no unyielding formula, but is free to effect
justice according to the equities peculiar to
each transaction wherever.a failure to perform
a duty to convey property would result in unjust
enrichment. 209 P.2d at 232, (emphasis added)
This standard is accepted by the majority of jurisdictions.

As

stated in 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trusts, §236:
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is induced on the agreement of a fiduciary
or confidant to hold in trust for a reconveyance
or other purpose, where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is one upon which the grantor justifiably can and does rely and where the
agreement is breached, since the breach of the
agreement is an abuse of the confidence, and to
establish such a trust it is not necessary to
show fraud or intent not to perform the agreement when it was made. The tendency of the
courts is to construe the term "confidence or
"confidential relationship'' liberally in favor
-of the confider and against the confidant, for
the purpose of raising a constructive trust on
a violation or betrayal thereof.
For other Utah cases imposing a constructive trust upon abuse of
a confidential relationship, see Hawkins v. Perry, 12 3 Utah 16,
253 P.2d 372 (1953); Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 133, 141 P.2d

882 (1943); and Free v. Farnsworth, 105 Utah 583, 144 P.2d 532
(1943).

All of these decisions were based on a desire to do

justice between the parties and prevent the fraudulent enrichment
of one party who had violated the confidence of another*

These

decisions reflect a well-established Utah doctrine which was not
properly applied by the trial court.
The evidence at trial clearly showed the prerequisite conditions of confidence and trust.

In fact, a statement to this

effect was found in the contract itself (Ex. 1):
The sellers acknowledge that they are making a conveyance of title to the buyers prior to
the payment of the full purchase price, but that
they do so knowing of the credibility of the
buyers and with full trust and confidence in the
buyers. (p. 3).
Further evidence of the relationship of the parties was the fact
that no interest was charged on the unpaid balance.

Uncontra-

dicted evidence at the trial showed that the Nielsons trusted
Carter and believed that he would convey the property even though
the deed made no mention of a reservation to the Rasmussens.
(Tr. 95-96, 102, 168).
An additional factor that must be considered is the advanced
age and condition of the decedent Archie Nielson and of Sylvia
Nielson.

Again, the uncontraverted testimony at trial showed

that Mr. Nielson had only one leg, was confined mainly to his
house, and that he was past seventy years of age.

In fact,

counsel for the respondents stipulated that Mr. Nielson was
crippled and that he had problems getting around.

The applica-

tion of an implied trust is more necessary in such circumstances
than it would be under normal conditions.

This rule is set forth

in the California case of Adams v. Bloom, 142 P.2d 775 (Calif.

1943) . As in Adams , Nielson was old and relied on the statements
of one whom he trusted.

In affirming the trial court decree

which had imposed a constructive trust, the appellate court
defined the confidential relationship standard with regard to
those of advanced age:
It is not essential to show a relationship by affinity or consanguinity, or that the
business transacted established a particular relationship between the parties, such as attorney and client or principal and agent. If the
parties be friends, and the grantor repose confidence in the grantee, especially if in addition there exist an advisory business relationship, and the one reposing confidence be of advanced age, an implied trust may result. (emphasis added)
All of the evidence in this case points to the trust and
confidence involved.

The statements in the legal documents, the

lack of legal specificity, the prior dealings of the parties, and
the ages and acts of Archie and Sylvia Nielson, all clearly show
that the relationship was one of confidence £nd trust.

The trial

court's finding of fact to the contrary is clearly erroneous and
should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
The clear weight of the evidence at trial showed that the
third-party defendant, Bert Carter, had received the fifteen
acres in question subject to an agreement that he would convey
four of the lots in that acreage to the defendant Rasmussens;.
His refusal to do so was a breach of that promise and the trial
court's failure to impose a constructive trust was error.

The

evidence clearly showed the requisite confidential relationship
between the grantors and grantees.

In failing to impose the

constructive trust, the trial court violated the rules of law set

forth by this Court in the Haws v. Jensen decision.

Therefore,

the appellants ask this Court to reverse the findings of the
trial court and to order judgment entered accordingly.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this

31 — day of March, 1976.

S. R2X LEWIS, for^
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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